by Bill Anderson/photos as noted
Numerous articles, books, and reports have been published since the mid-1960s highlighting the trials and tribulations associated with the Metroliners’ development and operations. Some even highlighted the positives, such as ridership increases and higher-profile marketing efforts. However, the understanding of why the Metroliners were so successful has never been fully explained, or at least presented in stark clarity.
The most recently discovered Metroliner article, in The Journal of Transportation History, was entitled “Moonshots to Nowhere? The Metroliner and Failed High-Speed Rail in the United States, 1962-1977.” While this 2022 article is factually correct, its thesis was based on the wrong premise. The Metroliner clearly was not the ultimate engineering success, but in the big picture that was background noise. The Metroliner was a success because its riders, and the employees and others supporting the service, made it so, in spite of all the challenges that have been so thoroughly memorialized.
A Quick Review
What became the Metroliner service was politically inspired and, in retrospect, laced with unrealistic expectations and deadlines. The High Speed Ground Transportation Act of 1965 (HSGT) was another Congressional reactionary response to the United States being badly upstaged by a former enemy, Japan. In this case, the “do something about it” came from the stir caused by Japan’s high-speed (initially 125 mph) trains that had started revenue service the previous year.
ABOVE: Among the media luminaries on the July 13, 1974, high-speed press run were Trains magazine Editor David P. Morgan (right foreground) and the Washington Post’s Don Phillips, who appear to be sharing a lighter moment. The 150-mph run is about to begin. When Morgan was asked what he thought about the high-speed sprint, he responded somewhat dryly that it was about the same as a jet airliner at take-off speed. —Bill Anderson photo
The HSGT program was structured as something of a public/private partnership to design, build, and operate high-speed trains on the Pennsylvania Railroad (PRR) main line between New York City and Washington, D.C. As the under-funded and continually delayed project moved forward, it became a frustration for all the parties involved. Consider the following overarching issues:
First, PRR committed tens of millions of dollars for infrastructure and rolling stock. However, that railroad’s financial strength was failing fast and it was desperate for a lifeline in the form of the federal government’s approval of a merger with New York Central.
Second, the HSGT program attempted to take what was generally decades-old technology and infrastructure and jump-start it into a high-speed performance paradigm.
Third, A never-ending list of “bugs” continued to haunt attempts to achieve revenue service.
ABOVE: The Metroliners were unlike anything previously experienced by passengers on the Northeast Corridor. Among many changes, the “parlor car” designation was relegated to history. This is an Amtrak MetroClub car in 1971. —Amtrak; George H. Drury Collection
Inaugural Runs
However, through the strength of key team members, the program pressed ahead. On January 15, 1969, a press run was made with a six-car train from Washington, D.C., to New York City. The next day, revenue passengers took the first-ever official rides on the Metroliner.
Shock might have been the best word to describe what happened after that first high-speed “demonstration” service began. Most of the negative press coverage fairly quickly shifted the equipment and other delay problems into the background. After a sampling of the Metroliner service by the media, politicians, and committed air travelers, most skeptical expectations were exceeded. New complaints arose — in some cases petty issues caused by success, such as the need to stand in line to buy a ticket due to the Metroliners’ popularity. Daily sold-out trains were more the rule than exception, and actually rippled into a slight increase in ridership on conventional trains and greater pressure to increase the Metroliner schedule.
The NEC in the 1960s
On April 30, 1961, Eastern Airlines began the Eastern Air Shuttle (soon known to travelers simply as “the Shuttle”), providing frequent service between regional New York City airports at Newark and LaGuardia and both Washington (National Airport) and Boston. What set this service apart was not only what quickly became hourly departures, but a guaranteed seat with no advance reservations, even if additional aircraft were needed for second or more sections.
ABOVE: Sold-out Metroliners were the norm on Fridays and Sundays. —Bill Anderson photo
For those who only know air travel as it has been over the past few decades, it is probably inconceivable that one could board a commercial airliner without a picture ID, making it through a gauntlet of not-particularly-friendly government workers, and a boarding pass. The Shuttle remade travel in the NEC to a standard that left PRR’s New York–Washing-ton service far behind.
The rail service in place as the Shuttle took to the sky could hardly compete. With most trains taking most of four hours between the New York and Washington end points, the Shuttle’s gate-to-gate timing of an hour at a cost that was less than a PRR parlor car seat was an easy win for Eastern Airlines. The deteriorating condition of NEC infrastructure and rolling stock was in line with PRR’s declining financial condition and was obvious to deserting train riders.
So, between the Shuttle capturing the time-sensitive, price-inelastic market, and Greyhound and other bus lines offering lower fares for the price-sensitive market, PRR’s dozen daily round-trip trains were being squeezed. In fact, if it were not for intermediate markets, particularly Philadelphia, it is likely that at least some of the New York City–Washington trains would have been the subject of Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC) hearings to remove them before the first Metroliner hit the rails…